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Abstract 
Japan has had an outsized influence on global monetary policy. Avoiding 
becoming Japan has been a powerful force for Quantitative Easing.  This paper 
argues, that despite popular perceptions, Japanese economic performance has 
not been a calamity; living standards have risen consistently over time and a 
full-fledged deflationary spiral avoided.  These outcomes render making 
judgements about the Bank of Japan’s (BOJ) track record challenging despite 
the failure to meet the inflation target.  The BOJ’s conceptual evolution on 
monetary policy and the various measures adopted over time are analysed for a 
fuller assessment of the effectiveness of monetary policy in Japan. The paper 
discusses the nascent, but increasingly influential academic research on the 
limitations of QE and its collateral effects on the economy, and what that 
portends for future BOJ policy. 
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Economic developments in Japan over the past two decades 
have had a profound impact on how macro policy has been conducted 
globally.  Essentially, the focus of macro policy from both a practical 
and analytical perspective has been on how best to avoid replicating 
the Japanese experience.  Aggressive monetary easing to combat the 
deflationary fallout from the Great Recession had its roots not only in 
                                                        
* I am grateful to the Bank of Japan for having me as a Visitor at the Institute 
for Monetary and Economic Studies in May 2018, and to the many senior 
officials who were generous with their time during discussions.  The views 
expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and should not be 
attributed to the Bank of Japan. 
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the lessons of the Great Depression, but equally importantly, on trying 
to avoid becoming Japan.   
 
The strongest proponent of the view that monetary policy has to 
be aggressive and pre-emptive in precluding a repeat of Japan’s tryst 
with deflation is former Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke.  His influential 
2002 speech was in fact titled: “Deflation: making sure it doesn’t 
happen here”.  This was followed by his 2003 paper, “Some Thoughts 
on Monetary Policy in Japan”, which set out the aggressive case for 
large scale asset purchases, price level targeting and cooperation 
between the Bank of Japan and the Ministry of Finance to beat 
deflation1. 
 
Other work in similar vein predating the Great Recession 
includes Krugman (1998) who argued that monetary expansion at the 
zero bound is a necessary but not sufficient condition to generate 
inflation.  He made the case that the Bank of Japan (BOJ) had to 
convince the public that monetary expansion was permanent and 
allow for an inflation overshoot to escape the zero bound and liquidity 
trap.  A more formal case for combining monetary expansion and 
forward guidance to combat deflation in Japan was made by 
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).  So, when the financial crisis struck 
the global economy in 2008, the Japanese experience implied that 
there had already been a significant amount of analytical work on zero 
interest rates, Quantitative Easing (QE) and forward guidance as tools 
for combating deflation. 
 
This discussion raises some key issues from a policy 
perspective.  First, how bad has Japanese economic experience been 
in the last two decades to warrant such a visceral policy reaction 
                                                        
1 A detailed documentation of Bernanke’s views on Japan over time are sent out 
in his Brookings Paper of 2017. 
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function?  How did policy respond to the entrenched disinflationary 
forces in Japan?  Has that policy response been effective?  How is 
policy likely to evolve in Japan and what are the broader lessons for 
other countries that have embarked on aggressive monetary easing.   
 
A natural starting point is to look at trends in key economic 
indicators so that the data can be juxtaposed against perceptions.  The 
surprising inference from the data, as documented in the next section, 
appears to be that Japanese economic performance is not as 
calamitous as is generally perceived when viewed from the totality of 
its circumstances.  The key point is that Japan has manged to sustain 
reasonable per capita GDP growth and has not fallen into a 
deflationary spiral despite two decades of virtual price stability.  The 
very low GDP growth and lack of inflation appear to be driven largely 
by structural factors.   
 
The policy section of the paper documents the history of the 
BOJ’s monetary policy response as the economy repeatedly slid into 
and out of mild deflation for more than two decades.  It also traces the 
analytical evolution of the BOJ’s views on aggressive monetary 
easing, particularly on QE.  Aggressive monetary easing has failed to 
meet the BOJ’s inflation targets in a sustained way, but the paper 
argues that making judgements about its success or failure is not 
straightforward.  The BOJ had to combat structural disinflationary 
dynamics in Japan, along with the additional headwind of low global 
inflation over the last decade; the counterfactual—whether Japan 
would have slipped into a deflationary spiral in the absence of 
aggressive monetary easing—is argued to be particularly difficult to 
evaluate empirically.  In any case, QE is shown to have had the effect 
of keeping bond yields low and stable amidst an exploding debt, even 
though that has never been a stated objective of QE in Japan.  QE, 
therefore, provided an implicit backstop to the worrisome debt 
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dynamics in Japan through spill-overs from the stated objective of 
pushing inflation higher.   
 
It is, however, becoming increasingly apparent that there are 
growing costs in continuing with additional monetary easing. The 
initial focus of academic research on QE focused mainly on how asset 
purchase programmes can be effective in combating deflationary 
tendencies in the economy.  That made sense given the deflationary 
problems that policy had to confront over the last decade.  But as QE 
has become more mature and entrenched, with monetary policy being 
gradually normalised in the U.S, the focus of academic research has 
recently turned towards capturing some of the limitations of QE and 
its collateral effects on the economy.  This paper discusses some of 
this research and examines how that is likely to have a bearing on the 
evolution of monetary policy in Japan.  
     
Key Economic Trends 
 
Let us start with the most basic observation about the 
economy—Chart 1 plots GDP growth since the bursting of the asset 
bubble in Japan. 
 
Chart 1. Japan GDP Growth (YoY, %) 
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Taking out the large fluctuations in growth associated with the 
financial crisis during 2008-10, GDP has grown on average around a 
relatively steady 1% pace in the last two decades.  Potential growth in 
Japan is estimated at a 0.75-1% range.  This makes Japan the slowest 
growing economy among the G7 countries, with the exception of 
Italy, which has averaged less than 1% growth in the last two decades. 
 
Slow growth in Japan appears to have been driven largely by 
stagnant population and rapid ageing.  In fact, the Japanese population 
today is a little lower than it was in 2000.  Moreover, the working age 
population in Japan has contracted by about 14% since 2000, while 
working age population increased by the same factor in this period in 
the U.S—a contrast striking in its magnitude.  Charts 2 and 3 provide 
a perspective on the trends in per capita incomes in Japan and the U.S. 
 
Chart 2. Per Capita GDP growth in Japan and the U.S. (YoY, %) 
 
Source: IMF data base 
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Chart 3. Index of Per Capita GDP for Japan and the U.S. (2000 = 
100) 
 
Source: IMF data base 
 
That is, measured on a per capita GDP basis, Japan has not 
performed all that badly.  It has underperformed the U.S. economy by 
a cumulative 3 percentage points since 2000—hardly a calamity.  
Since discussions about growth comparisons tend to focus mainly on 
GDP, and Japan is an outlier in terms of population growth and 
ageing population, Japanese economic performance tends to be 
viewed in a far more negative light than it really should be. 
 
The tightness of the labour market—unemployment is currently 
at around 2.5% (Chart 4), close to the lows reached during 1990—
implies that the growth performance has been far from deplorable; in 
fact, the Japanese economy will find it difficult to support much 
higher growth.   
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Chart 4. Unemployment Rate in Japan 
 
Source: IMF data base 
 
It is not just that unemployment is very low; participation rates 
have been rising and the ratio of job offers to job seekers is at 1.6, 
close to an all-time high.  However, despite a historically tight labour 
market, and the political pressure on employers to boost wages, wage 
earnings has on average grown by less than 1% in the last 10 years.  
There has been an active debate for some time now about why such  a 
tight labour market has failed to generate any wage inflation.  The 
arguments stretch from life-time employment policies which favour 
employment rather than wages, to the ingrained low and stable 
inflation expectations in Japan; but it is not necessary to get into that 
debate for the purposes of this paper2. 
 
Japan has essentially experienced price stability on average 
during the last 20 years.  Chart 5 shows that consumer price inflation 
has basically been alternating in ranges between +1/-1% in the last 20 
years with the result that prices have barely changed on average 
during this period—another remarkable outcome. 
                                                        
2 A good discussion of these issues can be found in Bank of Japan (2016).  See 
also Porcellacchia (2016). 
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Chart 5.  Inflation in Japan 
 
Source: IMF data base 
 
The critical point to note here is that despite the various shocks 
that the Japanese economy has been subject to over the last 20 years, 
it never really fell into sustained deflation.  This is particularly 
important because the macro consensus has maintained that a 
sustained period of very low inflation leads to deflationary 
expectations and eventual deflation.  It has, in fact, been one of the 
strongest arguments given by central bankers around the world for the 
need to combat low inflation with aggressive monetary easing.  But 
that just does not seem to have happened in Japan—it appears that 
nominal rigidities not only capped inflation on the upside in Japan, 
but also capped the magnitude of deflation.   
 
In surveys conducted by the Bank of Japan about what 
consumers expect inflation on average to be in the next 5 years, the 
median expectation has consistently been in the 2-3% range during 
the last 12 years.  The Bank of Japan itself does not put much store on 
this Survey; but even if one does not take these expectations literally, 
the point to take away is that it is not easy to identify strong 
deflationary expectations among Japanese consumers.  This lack of 
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deflationary expectations is consistent with Japan not falling into a 
contractionary spiral—in fact its per capita GDP has grown at around 
the average pace for the G7 countries over the past two decades.  The 
Japanese economic performance in the last couple of decades is a 
world apart from the economic and political traumas associated with 
the Great Depression.  Japan has, contrary to popular perceptions, 
managed to provide for gradual but consistent increases in living 
standards for its population. 
 
That the Japanese economy is pretty much close to its potential 
is reflected not just in the tightness of the labour market, but also 
partly in its trade in goods and services moving close to balance.  The 
evolution of the current account is of course driven by valuation and 
exchange rate effects associated with Japan’s large holdings of 
external assets (Chart 6). 
 
Chart 6.  Trade and Current Accounts in Japan. 
 
Source: IMF data base 
 
The external balances for Japan are thus of a very different order 
of magnitude from that of Germany, and the argument therefore for 
boosting macro policies to reduce external imbalances is just not as 
compelling for Japan. 
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The stand-alone imbalances in Japan are clearly in the fiscal 
sphere.  Repeated attempts to boost the economy through fiscal policy 
and the lack of tax and structural reforms to make debt sustainable 
have left fiscal balances in dire shape (Charts 7 and 8). 
 
Chart 7. Japan—General Government Balances 
 
Source: IMF data base 
 
Chart 8. Japan—General Government Gross and Net Debts (% 
of GDP) 
 
Source: IMF data base 
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Japan’s fiscal situation certainly appears dire from these charts.  
The deficits have never been brought under control since the bursting 
of the asset price bubble and debt has exploded.  Gross debt is close to 
240% of GDP, a magnitude unprecedented by that of any other 
country.  Nevertheless, QE has fundamentally changed the perception 
of debt sustainability, at least in terms of risk-premia associated with 
long-term yields.  The fact that net-debt is 130% of GDP, the BOJ 
holds assets equal to almost 100% of GDP, and almost all of the debt 
is in local currency and held by local entities has made it virtually 
impossible for the market to assign a meaningful risk-premium to 
Japanese debt. 
 
Macro Policies in Japan 
 
Up until the Abe administration took over in December 2012, 
economic policies can be broadly encapsulated as being driven by the 
perception, or an implicit framework along the following lines.  The 
Ministry of Finance consistently pushed for fiscal consolidation—
their world view was that feckless politicians were pushing Japan to 
the cusp of a slow moving fiscal crisis.  The Bank of Japan used to 
view low inflation as being largely structural, and took the view that 
monetary policy could only have a limited impact in pushing inflation 
higher.  Moreover, they were sceptical about zero interest rates, which 
was perceived as encouraging moral hazard, and asset purchases by 
the central bank, which was seen as giving a free ride to politicians 
who did not have sufficient incentives to grapple with long-term fiscal 
issues. 
 
Despite this latent resistance to monetary and fiscal expansion 
from the policy experts, Japan witnessed plenty of both as the 
economy was buffeted, first by the bursting of the asset-price bubble 
in the early 1990s, and then by the Asian crisis and the domestic 
banking crisis during 1997-2000.  The BOJ’s policy rate had already 
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been reduced to 50bps by the mid-1990s, and closer to zero in the late 
1990s as the disinflationary effects of the financial crisis spread 
across the economy.  The BOJ was forced to move into Quantitative 
Easing in 2001 as the bursting of the global technology bubble 
intensified the disinflationary forces in the economy.  This was 
essentially the first full-fledged QE in the post-war period for an 
industrial country; it, however, targeted the current account reserves 
(required reserves + excess reserves) with the central bank, rather 
than the quantity of assets to be purchased by the central bank.  
Reaching the targeted current account balances, of course, involved 
asset purchases by the BOJ, but these purchases were seen as the 
means to reach the targeted current account balances with the central 
bank.3  
 
Targeting current account balances with the central bank was 
perceived as the primary transmission channel to combat deflation.  
The underlying theory behind this was that banks were more 
important than capital markets for financial intermediation in Japan 
compared to the United States; consequently, the conjecture was that 
commercial banks when flooded with excess reserves would be driven 
to lend some of that to the real economy.  This, in turn, was expected 
to offset deflationary tendencies.  That is, the first stage of QE in 
Japan was structured to work more through unlocking the bank 
lending channel than through the portfolio balance effect4. 
 
Inflation did rise gradually during this phase of QE in Japan 
during 2001-05.  However, that was truncated by the financial crisis 
in 2008, and Japan slipped back into deflation.  When the BOJ 
                                                        
3 Shirai (2018) provides a detailed documentation about the various phases of 
QE in Japan. 
4 An interesting discussion of the conceptual differences between the portfolio 
balance channel and the excess reserves channel can be found in Christensen 
and Krogstrup (2018) 
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launched its second round of QE in 2010, it was neither novel nor 
unique; Japan was just part of the aggressive global monetary easing 
involving QE. 
 
The unstated technical consensus in Japan—i.e. that structural 
low inflation was difficult to offset with monetary policy, and that 
fiscal consolidation was needed for the long-term viability of the 
economy—was broken when Shinzo Abe won a landslide victory in 
November 2012 and launched Abenomics in December 2012.  The 
essence of Abenomics was to break out of the low inflation trap 
through aggressive monetary and fiscal policies and sustain growth 
through structural policies that reduced labour and product market 
rigidities. 
 
The transformative moment for monetary policy in Japan was 
the appointment of Haruhiko Kuroda as the Governor of the BOJ in 
March 2013.  Kuroda had been a long standing critique of the BOJ for 
not taking aggressive actions to combat low inflation.  In his very first 
monetary policy meeting in April 2013 he introduced Quantitative 
and Qualitative Monetary easing (QQE) to achieve an inflation target 
of 2% in 2 years. 
 
The essence of QQE was to double the monetary base in two 
years, by increasing the purchase of JGBs to an annual pace of about 
¥50 trillion in order to increase the monetary base at an annual pace of 
¥60-70 trillion.  Asset purchases were structured to double the 
average remaining maturity of JGBs held by the BOJ from 3 to 7 
years.  The BOJ also moved its policy target from the uncollateralised 
overnight call rate to the monetary base. 
 
This monetary easing associated with the first round of QQE 
weakened the exchange rate significantly, ratcheted up asset prices 
and pushed inflation up.  With consumption taxes being raised from 5 
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to 8% in April 2014, headline inflation briefly breached 2%. 
However, with the economy slowing as the consumption tax bit into 
spending and with base-effects coming off, headline inflation slid 
back again in the second half of 2014. 
 
The BOJ responded aggressively to the decline in inflation and 
inflation expectations in the second half of 2014. At its meeting on 31 
October 2014,  JGB purchases were announced to be increased at an 
annual pace of ¥80 trillion—about ¥30 trillion higher than before.  
The average maturity of BOJ holdings of JGBs were to increase from 
about 7 years to about 10 years.  ETF and JREIT purchases were 
increased from an annual pace of ¥1 trillion to 3 trillion.  The BOJ 
was essentially signalling to the market that it would do whatever it 
takes to push inflation to its target. 
 
With the yen stabilising and then appreciating rapidly at the end 
of 2015 in response to a bout of risk-aversion connected with 
vulnerabilities in China, the BOJ came up with further easing 
measures.  At its meeting on January 29, 2016 the BOJ introduced 
what it called QQE with negative rates.  While JGB purchases were to 
continue at an annualized rate of ¥80 trillion and ETF and JREIT 
purchases at ¥3 trillion, a segment of the current accounts held by 
financial institutions at the BOJ were to be charged 10 bps.   That is, 
the BOJ made its first foray into negative rates.  The impact of 
negative rates on banks was partially mitigated by not applying the 
negative rates on required reserves and applying the negative rate 
only to those balances in excess of the reserves held at the end of 
2015. 
 
In November 2016, the BOJ made further changes to monetary 
policy, introducing yield curve control to the menu of QQE with 
negative interest rates.  The BOJ indicated that it would purchase 
JGBs in quantities that ensured 10-year yields would remain around 
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0%.  The JGB purchases were forecast to continue at around an 
annual pace of ¥80 trillion, but that number was clearly not binding 
given the yield target.  ETF and JREIT purchases were doubled from 
an annual pace of ¥3 to 6 trillion.  The BOJ presented the adoption of 
yield curve control as further monetary easing that was compatible 
with an inflation overshooting commitment.  Yield curve control was 
also presented as monetary easing that was sustainable, as the 
growing stocks of JGB’s held by the BOJ made it possible to lower 
yields to target levels even with gradually declining additional 
purchases of JGBs.  That is, the BOJ argued that as the stocks of 
JGBs held by it crossed a certain threshold, the stocks had a more 
powerful impact on monetary conditions than flows5. 
 
There are two interesting features to the monetary policy 
conducted under Kuroda.  First, the BOJ was willing at every stage to 
ramp up its already aggressive monetary easing when inflation failed 
to reach its target.  This reflected the analytical shift that inflation is 
ultimately a monetary phenomenon and that an unwavering central 
bank will provide the credibility to push inflation expectations up and 
ultimately inflation.  In that sense, it was consistent with the 
frameworks of Krugman (1998), Eggertson and Woodford (2003).  
However, following the implementation of QQE with negative rates 
and yield curve control, the BOJ has been less sanguine about any 
further ramping up of monetary easing.  In that sense, it is now more 
in tune with the theoretical framework of McKay, Nakamura and 
Steinsson (2016) that, in the absence of complete markets, the power 
of forward guidance to push up inflation is likely to be limited.  
 
The other aspect of monetary policy and forward guidance 
under Kuroda has been its unwavering belief, reflected in its forecast, 
that inflation will reach its 2% target.  While the target has been 
                                                        
5 See Kuroda’s speech of December 7, 2017. 
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repeatedly missed, the BOJ has simply rolled forward the time when 
inflation meets the target.  Why has the BOJ stuck so firmly by its 
forecasts?  A BOJ research paper by Hattori, Kong, Packer and 
Sekine (2016) provides the analytical thinking behind the central 
bank’s sticky inflation forecasts.  They argue that forward guidance is 
an important part of monetary easing and that the central bank’s 
inflation forecast is a critical part of forward guidance.  Moreover, 
their empirical estimations show that even if the BOJ forecasts do not 
dominate the private sector forecasts in terms of accuracy, they 
nevertheless had a significant influence on private sector forecasts, 
and through that on inflation expectations.  That is, there appears to 
be an underlying theoretical rationale for the BOJ to stick by its 
inflation forecast despite the credibility of those forecasts becoming 
increasingly challenged.    
 
Effectiveness of Monetary Policy 
 
Despite the BOJ throwing everything it could to ease monetary 
conditions, inflation has failed to reach its target.  Moreover, it does 
not look likely that it will reach the target of 2% in the time horizon 
relevant for monetary policy—i.e. the next 2 years. 
 
This raises two related issues.  First, to what extent can 
monetary policy combat the structural forces driving low inflation in 
Japan.  And, more importantly, are there rising costs from 
increasingly aggressive monetary easing to overcome structural low 
inflation. 
 
The effectiveness of aggressive monetary easing in Japan, like 
in other jurisdictions, is a hard one to quantify.  The fact that inflation 
has failed to reach its target is presumably a signal of the lack of 
success of aggressive and sustained monetary easing. In other words, 
the structural disinflationary forces in Japan appear to be too strong 
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for monetary policy to combat fully.  However, it is always possible 
to justify the success of QE in terms of counterfactuals.  That is, in the 
absence of aggressive QE, Japan might have slipped into deflationary 
territory.  It is hard to provide evidence based arguments for or 
against counterfactuals, but the fact that Japan experienced 8 quarters 
of continuous positive growth until the last quarter of 2017—the first 
time that has happened in two decades—perhaps attests to the positive 
role played by QE.  In any case, QE had the effect of keeping bond 
yields low and stable amidst an exploding debt, even though that has 
never been a stated objective of QE in Japan. 
 
It is hard to provide an unambiguous verdict on the success of 
QE in Japan—inflation did not reach the target, but it did not fall into 
a deflationary spiral either, and it took the risk-premium out of an 
exploding debt market.  But have there been significant adverse spill-
overs from aggressive monetary policy?  And are these costs likely to 
increase over time?  More radically, could further monetary easing 
turn out to have the perverse effect of having a contractionary impact 
on the economy? 
 
There is a strand of literature that argues that monetary policy is 
structurally less powerful in Japan compared with that in the U.S. or 
even in the Eurozone6. Low Household debt and large cash holdings 
in Japan (currency and demand deposits held by Japanese households 
constitute over 50% of financial assets compared to about 14% in the 
United States), imply that monetary easing will be less powerful in 
Japan than in other countries.  The positive effects of low interest 
rates on household liabilities are likely to be offset by the negative 
effects of low interest rates on large cash holdings7.  At worst, 
                                                        
6 See Muelbauer and Murata (2011) and Shirai (2018). 
7 A VAR model of the Japanese economy by Ramaswamy and Rendu (2000) 
provides some supporting evidence for this hypothesis by showing that the 
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negative rates are even argued to have the perverse effect of reducing 
household spending.  Similar effects are also seen as holding true for 
Japanese corporates which have large cash holdings compared to 
international peers.  That is, the structural transmission of monetary 
policy is seen as operating largely through the exchange rate with 
diminishing returns to additional easing.  The yield curve control, 
targeting a zero 10-year yield, is seen as being particularly damaging 
for pension funds, insurance companies and banks.   
 
How is the BOJ’s policy stance likely to evolve given this 
debate and the inflation and growth outcomes so far?  It will be 
difficult for the BOJ to play the role of a dispassionate academic 
bystander in evaluating monetary policy under current circumstances.  
The BOJ is a credible central bank with a strong research department 
and will clearly be cognisant of the objective conditions under which 
monetary policy operates and its limitations.  However, given that its 
forward guidance is a powerful part of its monetary kit, it would be 
difficult for the BOJ to simply call it a day at this stage and state that 
the limits to monetary policy have been reached, even if its analytical 
work were to point in that direction.  It would surely have to contend 
with the impact on the yen, the equity markets and inflation 
expectations from making any such an assessment explicit. 
 
A move to cap monetary easing at current levels or to even 
move away from negative rates or extreme yield curve control would 
depend upon two factors.  First, on global economic and market 
developments, particularly the extent to which normalisation of 
monetary policy proceeds in the U.S.  A stronger than expected U.S. 
economy which leads to interest rates normalising at higher than 
expected levels is likely to weaken the yen and provide more leeway 
                                                        
response of private consumption to the significant monetary easing in the 1990s 
was muted. 
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for the BOJ to move away from some of the aggressive monetary 
easing measures.  Clearly, a stronger Japanese economy will also 
allow the BOJ to move away from negative rates and extreme yield 
curve control to targeting somewhat higher levels of 10 year yields 
that could be more supportive of the financial system. 
 
Second, as more research and data become available on QE, 
providing a deeper understanding of the implications of aggressive 
monetary easing, this will have a bearing on the changing perceptions 
of QE by central banks and will influence how QE programmes are 
modified.  The focus of academic research and innovations related to 
QE have so far largely focused on how the asset purchase 
programmes can be effective in combating deflationary tendencies in 
the economy.  That made sense given the deflationary problems that 
policy had to confront over the last decade.  But as QE has become 
more mature and ingrained, with monetary policy being normalised in 
the U.S, and the discussion turning towards possible exit strategies in 
other jurisdictions, the focus of academic research has recently turned 
gradually towards capturing some of the limitations of QE and its 
collateral effects on the economy.  
 
Two influential papers have addressed the limitations and 
collateral effects from QE.  The arguments themselves are not new, 
but  Eggertson, Juelsrud and Wold(2017) provide a formal framework 
to argue that standard macroeconomic models used to analyse 
monetary policy overstate the stimulative impact of zero interest rates.  
The standard models assume that there is just one interest rate 
controlled directly by the central bank; that is, they implicitly assume 
that the lending rate is independent of the deposit rate.  However, 
there is a zero lower bound on deposit rates—i.e. the negative policy 
rate is not passed through to households and firms.  This lower bound 
on deposit rates will constrain the extent to which lending rates can be 
slashed without seriously denting bank profitability and hence zero or 
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negative rates do not flow through into the economy and therefore are 
much less stimulative than what the models assume.  While the 
stimulus does not fully flow through, the collateral effect is passed on 
in the form of lower bank profits  
 
This argument is pushed a level further by Brunnermeier and 
Koby (2018).  They argue that under QE there can actually  be 
interest rate reversals. That is, at a certain low interest rate, 
accommodative monetary policy reverses its intended effect and 
actually becomes contractionary for the economy.  To put it 
differently, monetary policy under QE becomes non-linear in interest 
rates—lowering interest rates is stimulative up to a certain level of 
interest rate, and below that threshold, lowering rates further becomes 
contractionary.  That threshold does not necessarily have to be 
negative, but can even be somewhat above zero under certain 
circumstances.  Without going into a lot of detail about the model and 
its simulations, the main thrust of the argument is that the banks’ 
recapitalization gains from lower interest rates are one-off and are 
offset by the multi-period decline in interest rate margins as interest 
rates get closer to zero.  In fact, as QE removes bonds from the 
balance sheets of banks, it can lead to a creeping up of the “reversal” 
interest rate by limiting the capital gains accruing from lower interest 
rates.  The policy implication of the Brunnermeier and Koby paper is 
that the combination of QE and zero interest rates has to be carefully 
sequenced so that monetary policy is not overwhelmed by the 
negative collateral effects.  In any case, the analysis implies that there 
are clear limits to aggressive monetary easing. 
 
These studies provide a flavour of how the academic arguments 
for QE are evolving as we get more history regarding its operation 
and its collateral effects become more apparent.  The evolving 
academic research will clearly influence the thinking and operations 
of central banks going forward.  This is particularly true of the Bank 
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of Japan, where aggressive monetary easing is more advanced, 
structural factors exert a relatively stronger impact in keeping 
inflation low and the negative collateral impact on the financial 
system becomes increasingly apparent. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The Japanese experience has had an outsized influence on the 
way that aggressive monetary easing has been incorporated into other 
advanced economies following the financial crisis.  The urge to not 
replicate the Japanese experience has been a powerful driving force of 
zero interest rates and QE elsewhere.  The detailed data analysis, 
however, indicates that Japanese economic performance has not been 
the calamity of popular perception.  Japan has managed to deliver 
reasonable increases in living standards for its population (per capita 
GDP growth was just a cumulative 3 percentage points lower than 
that of the U.S. in the last two decades).  Contrary to conventional 
wisdom, two decades of price stability did not push Japan into a 
deflationary spiral and deep economic contraction.  Public debt has, 
however, exploded; but risk premia have been contained as the debt is 
primarily in local currency, held mainly by local entities and the 
BOJ’s asset purchases are now close to a cumulative 100% of GDP. 
 
The BOJ started off as a reluctant proponent of aggressive 
monetary easing in the late 1990s and into the Great Recession.  It 
worried about the moral hazard associated with zero interest rates and 
disincentives for fiscal consolidation that a QE programme would 
entail.  Moreover, low inflation was perceived as being largely 
structural.  Nevertheless, despite this conceptual hesitancy, the BOJ 
delivered substantial monetary stimulus in the form of zero interest 
rates and embarked on the first foray into QE in 2001.  The election of 
the Abe administration and the appointment of Kuroda to head the 
BOJ marked an important conceptual break for the central bank.  The 
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BOJ became an analytical proponent for aggressive monetary policy 
in lifting inflation higher; and theory was put into practice by 
launching one of the most aggressive monetary easing policies in 
2013.   
 
However, inflation has failed to meet the target in a sustained 
way despite the BOJ throwing everything in its arsenal to get it 
higher.  Evaluating the success of aggressive monetary easing in 
Japan is a tough one.  The structural disinflationary forces in the 
Japanese economy could simply be much stronger than what has been 
presumed.  And aggressive monetary easing can always be validated 
through the counterfactual of having precluded a bout of deflation.  In 
any case, as QE has matured globally, a nascent but growing 
academic literature has shifted the focus increasingly to the negative 
collateral effects from negative interest rates and the extreme flatness 
of yield curves from QE programmes. These analytical developments 
will influence how the BOJ evaluates further monetary easing; it may 
perhaps nudge it towards the search for appropriate exit strategies.    
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